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Abstract HPFT
HPFTP
This paper presents the; theoretical foundation and HPOP
application of two univariate failure detection HPOT
algorithms to Space Shuttl,; Main Engine (SSME) test LPFP
firing data. Both algorithms were applied to data LPOP
collected during steady-sutte operation of the engine, m
One algorithm, the time s_'.ries algorithm, is based on MCC
time series techniques and involves the computation of p(x)
autoregressive models. Tim_ series techniques have been
previously applied to SSMF data. The second algorithm Pxx(f)
is based on standard sigmd processing techniques. It PBP
consists of tracking the variations in the average signal PID
power with time. The average signal power algorithm is PSD
a newly proposed SSME failure detection algorithm, q-I
Seven nominal test firings were used to develop failure rxx [m]
indication thresholds fcr each algorithm. These
thresholds were tested using four anomalous firings and RPL
one additional nominal fi_g. Both algorithms provided SSME
significantly earlier failure indication times than did the T
current redline limit sysUm. Neither algorithm gave u(t)
false failure indications Ior the nominal firing. The x[n]
strengths and weaknesses of the two algorithms are y(t)
discussed and compared. The average signal power
algorithm was found to have several advantages over the
time series algorithm.
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Introduction
An investigation was conducted to demonstrate the
applicability of two steady-state failure detection
algorithms to Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) data.
One algorithm was based on time series techniques and
the other on signal processing techniques. The
algorithms were applied to improve the failure detection
capability of safety systems during ground test firings
and flight of the engine. With the current failure
detection and control system on the SSME, several test
firings have resulted in complete or partial loss of an
engine. Forty-two firings have been classified as
failures, and twenty-seven have had sufficient severity to
be labeled as major failures. 1 The majority of these
failures occurred during steady-state operation of the
engine. Although this represents a small percentage of
the more than 1300 hot fire tests to date, these failures
resulted in significant engine and facility damage, loss
of fleet leader engine components, and a delay in the
program schedule.
The current closed-loop SSME failure detection
system employs basic redline limits. There are five
redlined flight parameters; all monitor the high pressure
turbopumps. These are the High Pressure Fuel Turbine
(HPFT) and High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine (HI_T)
discharge temperatures, the High Pressure Fuel Pump
(HPFP) coolant liner pressure, the High Pressure
Oxidizer Pump (HPOP) intermediate seal purge
pressure, and the HPOT secondary seal cavity pressure.
The redlined parameters have upper and/or lower limits
assigned to them. Limit monitoring commences at
scheduled times during startup and continues until the
initiation of the shutdown phase. 2 The test firing
failures described in Ref. 1 are evidence that a more
advanced detection system is needed. The current limit
monitoring techniques are not capable of detecting
certain modes of failure with sufficient warning to avoid
major hardware and facility damage. Significant
improvements to safety would be realized by a system
capable of detecting failures earlier than the current
redline-based system.
Several advanced failure detection algorithms have
been proposed for the SSME. To date, they have been
tested off-line on past failures and nominal test firings
and have demonstrated the ability to detect failures prior
to the existing redline-limit system. One such
algorithm, which monitors individual parameters during
steady-state operation of the SSME, is the System for
Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) aigorithm.3
Another univariate approach which has been applied to
steady-state SSME data is time series analysis. 4 Two
multi-parameter algorithms have been proposed for
improved steady-state failure detection. They are the
Health Monitoring System for Rocket Engines
(HMSRE) algorithm5 and the clustering algorithm.4
Finally, an approach developed to detect failures during
non-steady-state operation of the SSME is the
Recursive Structure Identification (RESID) technique.4
Two univariate failure detection algorithms were
investigated and compared in this study. Both
algorithms were employed during steady-state operation
of the engine at 104 percent Rated Power Level (RPL)
and 109 percent RPL. The algorithm based on time
series techniques had been previously reported and
consisted of using Autoregressive (AR) models to
predict the future behavior of parameters based on their
past behavior. The time series algorithm was restricted
to stationary signals because it involved the
computation of models for signal prediction. Each
model was computed over a 4-see window, and errors
between predicted and actual values were tracked over
subsequent 4-see windows. The second algorithm
investigated, the average signal power algorithm, was
based on a well-developed signal processing technique
which has proven to be beneficial in all types of
mechanical signature analysis. 6 The algorithm consisted
of computing and tracking the average power of a signal
over a 2-see moving window. A smaller window was
possible for the average signal power algorithm because
this algorithm did not have model validity concerns.
The smaller window decreased the time until the
algorithm was available for failure detection.
Furthermore, a stationary assumption could be made
over the 2-see computation window, allowing the
average signal power algorithm to be applied to five
more parameters than the time series algorithm. This
paper presents the theoretical foundation of the time
series and average signal power algorithms, and
discusses their application to the SSME failure
detection problem. The failure indication times of the
two algorithms are presented, along with a comparison
of the strengths and weaknesses of the algorithms.
The application of the time series algorithm and the
average signal power algorithm was accomplished using
a system identification and signal processing software
package on a RISC workstation. Command and Data
Simulator (CADS) data from seven nominal SSME
tests were used to establish the failure indication
thresholds for each algorithm. These tests were A2-457,
A2-463, A2-479, A2-480, A2-481, A2-483, and A2-
484. Both algorithms were tested with CADS data from
four failures, A2-249, A1-340, A1-364, and A1-436,
and one recent nominal test firing, A1-618. The first
half of a test firing designation indicates the test stand
on which the firing took place, and the second half
indicates the test number. When the two algorithms
were used in the failure detection mode, AR models
were computed for 9 parameters, and the average signal
power was computed for 14 parameters. The AR
parameters were chosen because they typically displayed
stationary behavior during steady-state operation of the
engine. Furthermore, failure investigation summaries
indicated that some of the ptrameters chosen provided
early failure indications for many of the anomalous test
firings.2 Parameters which were strongly affected by
engine _s such as tank venting and pressurization
could not be analyzed by either algorithm. The average
signal power algorithm was applied to the one redlined
parameter which was availa31e in the four anomalous
data sets and which met the above considerations. This
parameter was the HPFT discharge temperature.
Time Series Techniques
System identification i:; the process of selecting
models created from experimental data that will
represent the system or some of its properties. The
approach generally followed is to model the system
using measured input and output signals. In special
cases where only single sign;ds are recorded, a model is
generated which will produce similar output when
excited by white noise.
Generally, most aPl:lications of parametric
estimation use discrete linear time series modeling
techniques. This is due to Wold's fundamental theorem,
which states that any stationary stochastic process can
be expressed as the sum of t_vo stationary and mutually
uncorrelated processes.6 For a general linear input-
output configuration, a con" plete model description is
given by
y(t) = G(q)u(.) + H(q)e(0 O)
where
G(q)= ,'__,g(k)q -k H(q)= 1+ _h(k)q -k
k=l k=l
(2)
and y(t)
and e(t)
system .7
is the output signal, u(t) is the input signal,
is an unmeasurable disturbance into the
The functions G and H are determined during
modeling. To estimate thes: functions, G and H are
parameterized as rational functions in the shift operator
q-l. By parameterizing Eq. (1), the general parametric
model structure is given by
.. C(q)
B(q) u(t) + D--_ e(t)A(q)y(t) = F--_q)
(3)
wh_
A(q) = I+ alq-1+ ..... +a_q -n"
B(q) = blq -I + b2q-Z+ ..... +babq-nb
C(q) = i+ elq-1+ ..... +encq -"c
D(q) = 1+ dlq-l+ ..... +dndq -nd
F(q) = 1+ flq-l+ ..... +fnfq -"f
The orders of the polynomials are given by na, nb, nc,
nd and nf. For the AR model nc=nd=nf=0, and
C(c0 = D(q) = F(q) = I. Another commonly used model
is the Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model
in which nd= nf = 0 and D(q) = F(q) = 1.7
When there is no input into the system, u(t) = 0,
the model given in Eq. 3 becomes
A(q)y(0 = C(q)c(O (4)
Equation (4) represents the general ARMA model
structure for the case when no input is present. For the
AR model, C(q) = 1 in Eq. (4). These univariate models
predict the behavior of a single parameter based upon
the analysis of the past data of that parameter. C(q) is
the moving average portion of the model, and attempts
to describe the properties of the disturbance term, e(t). 7
The decision of which model type and order to
select is a trade-off between implementation issues and
the accuracy with which the model is able to describe
the parameter. For example, in a real-time hardware
implementation AR represents less computational
burden than ARMA. Furthermore, for a given model
type, lower order models can be computed more quickly.
Therefore, given several models with similar prediction
capabilities, the least complex model should be chosen.
The Final Prediction Error (FPE), a measure of the
prediction capability of a model, simulates cross
validation with another data set. The model with the
smallest FPE should be chosen. The stability of the
model is checked using a pole-zero diagram; all poles
and zeros must lie within the unit circle. A near pole-
zero cancellation indicates that a lower order model
should be chosen. Also, if any of the uncertainty
regions associated with the poles or zeros overlap, or
cross the stability circle, a lower model order should be
chosen. The frequency response comparison and the
residual analysis are developed to determine the ability
of the model to predict the data. The residuals between
the actual data values and the modeled values should be
random noise for the model to be a good predictor of the
system. This is checked by computing the autocorrcla-
tion function of the residuals. 7
Signal Processing Techniques
For discrete random processes, probabilistic
functions are used to describe the behavior of the
system. The mean or expected value of a random
process at time n is given by Eq. (5):
_[n] = E{x[n]} (5)
where
_{x} = ixp(x)dx
and p(x) is the probability density function of x.
The autocorrelation function, rxx[nl,n2], of a
random process at two different times nl and n2 is
defined as
ru[n l, n2] = E{x[n l]x*[n2]} (7)
where x* is the complex conjugate of x. For a
stationary random process, the autocorrelation depends
only on the time-difference or lag index, nl-n2 or m.
The autocorrelation of a stationary discrete random
process is thus given by
r_[m] = E{x[n + m]x*[n]} (8)
To describe how the variance of a random process is
distributed with frequency, the Power Specwal Density
(PSD) is computed. For stationary signals the PSD is
given by Eq. (9), which is bandiimited to +1/(2"I"), and
is defined as the discrete-time Fourier transform of the
au_correlation function.
(9)
Pu(f) = T ___ru[m] exp(-j2_ffnT)
m_-_
The inverse discrete-time Fourier transform of Eq. (9)
yields an expression for the autocorrelation function
r_[m] = ___ Pxx(f)exp(j2_:fmT)df
(m)
If the autocorrelation function given in Eq. (10) is
evaluated at zero lag, then an expression for the average
signal power of a random stationary process results:
Average Signal Power = ru[0] = _.lb P_=(f)df
(11)
Equation (11) indicates that the area under the PSD is
the average power, and emphasizes that the PSD is a
density function that represents the distribution of
power with respect to frequency, s
Application
In applying the algorithms, several system
conditions required consideration in order to ensure that
the algorithms would not erroneously indicate an engine
fault. These conditions were sensor failure, propellant
tank venting and pressurization, and propellant transfer.
Both nominal and anomalous test firings have
experienced sensor failures. Sensor failure detection
methods must be employed before, or concurrently,
with safety monitoring algorithms in order to eliminate
the possibility of a sensor failure being interpreted as an
engine problem. For this investigation, all parameters
exhibiting sensor problems were removed prior to the
application of the two algorithms.
Some test firings have included propellant transfer
from barges, or propellant tank venting and pres-
surization. For several parameters, these processes
introduce transient excursions that are not due to power
level transitions. Figure l(a) illustrates the effect of
venting followed by pressurization on the HPOP inlet
pressure for test firing A2-463. The decrease and
subsequent increase observed in the signal correspond
directly to the venting and pressurization processes.
Figure l(b) shows the Main Combustion Chamber
(MCC) controller reference pressure for the same test.
The controller reference pressure has been included so
that the effects due to power level transitions can be
differentiated from the effects due to tank venting and
pressurization. In a test without venting or pres-
surization, the curves in Figs. l(a) and (b) would have
similar shapes.
Time Series Algorithm
AR models were computed for the nine parameters
indicated in Table 1. The Parameter Identification (PIE))
numbers listed in Table 1 are used to label the para-
meters on SSME data tapes. The additional parameters
given in Table 1 displayed excursions or non-stationary
4
behavior as compared t,> the model computation
interval, and thus did not satisfy the stationary
requirement of the time series algorithm. In many cases,
this non-stationary behavior was due to tank venting,
pressurization, or propellant transfer. In order to apply
the time series algorithm to additional parameters, a
method which would remove the transient effects caused
by these p_ is required.
The AR and ARMA iaodels were created during
4 sec of engine operation in which the parameter
exhibited steady-state or stationary behavior. Not all
parameters achieved steady-state behavior at the same
time following the scheduh_ completion of a transient.
Therefore, a safety factor cf at least 2 sec was allowed
prior to model construction This allowed models for all
parameters of a given test firing to be computed over
the same interval. For _'ase of computation and
interpretation, the mean was removed from the data
prior to model construction. The 4-sec window
represented a trade-off between model computation time
and model prediction accuracy. A larger computation
window increased the ability of the model to accurately
predict future signal behavior, however, a larger window
also increased the time dttring which the time series
algorithm was not available for safety monitoring.
Each model was evaluated using four criteria. These
criteria were (1) monitorin_ the FPE, (2) computing the
poles and zeros of the modal and checking for stability
and overlap, (3) comparing the actual frequency response
to that of the model, and (4) ensuring that the residual
autocorrelation function did not exceed the confidence
interval. In applying these criteria to AR and ARMA
models of various orders, it was found that the
autoregressive model of order five, AR[5], provided the
most consistent, adequate representation of the data.
This concurred with the pr¢ viously reported AR model
order applied to SSME data. 4 In general, it was found
that ARMA models introduced spurious information
into the model frequency response. Also, ARMA
models experienced stability problems, and had added
computational burden. AR models of an order less than
five successfully described only a minority of the
parameters. As the AR m(,del order was increased to
values greater than five, marginal improvements in the
FPE and the residual autl>correlation function were
sometimes observed, but the frequency response of the
model and data began to diw.rge.
Once a model had be_n created, it was used to
predict the future behavior of the signal. The 4-sec
window was moved forward in time in 1-sec increments;
thus, any two adjacent windows overlapped by
75 percent. For each window the autocorrelation
function of the residuals was computed for lags between
0 and 25. One lag was equivalent to one sampling
interval or 40 msec. When implemented in hardware,
the 1-sec time increment could be decreased to the
40 msec sampling rate to improve the failure detection
capability of the algorithm.
Due to the highly dynamic nature of the system,
the residual confidence interval was often exceeded for
the 3,2 nominal tests. This necessitated thresholds to be
established to prevent incorrect failure indications. The
thresholds given in Table 2 represent the maximum
absolute value of the residual autocorrelation function
for all of the A2 nominal tests at either 104 percent
RPL or 109 percent RPL. Although the models
generated at 104 percent RPL were often adequate in
describing the data at 109 percent RPL, both models
were computed in order to base the thresholds on a
larger data set. If the residual autocorrelation function
for the model computation window fell outside the
confidence interval, the model was not included in the
threshold determination. When used in the failure
detection mode, failure of an autocorrelation function to
fall within the threshold interval given in Table 2
resulted in a failure indication.
In applying the time series algorithm to parameters
that were susceptible to venting and pressurization,
extremely high thresholds were required to ensure no
false failure indications. This was expected since these
parameters exhibited non-stationary behavior. For
example, the Low Pressure Oxidizer Pump (LPOP)
shaft speed (PID 30) required a threshold of 0.9 on a
scale of one. A threshold of this magnitude clearly
indicates that the time series algorithm is not an
appropriate failure indicator.
Average Si_al Power Algorithm
The average signal power of various SSME
parameters was determined by computing the
autocorrelation at zero lag, as given by Eq. (11), for the
parameters listed in Table 1. This equation assumes that
the signal is stationary over the computation interval.
Although some parameters exhibited overall non-
stationary trends, stationary behavior was achieved
during the 2-sec computation interval. Therefore, the
computation of the average signal power using the
autocorrelation function was valid.
The average signal power calculations were
performed over 2-sec, 50 percent overlapping windows
for the A2 nominal test firings at both 104 percent RPL
and 109 percent RPL. In order to base the threshold
calculations on a larger data set, both engine power
levels were used in the determination of the failure
indication thresholds. This was possible since the
average signal power was not consistently higher at
either power level. The 2-see window and 1-see time
increment were selected for ease of computation. In a
hardware implementation, the window could be
decreased to minimize the initial computation time
during which the algorithm would not be available for
failure detection. Also, the time increment could be
decreased to improve the failure detection capability of
the algorithm. As in the time series algorithm, the
mean was removed from the data prior to the application
of the algorithm.
The average and three standard deviations of the
average signal power were computed for all seven A2
nominal firings at both engine power levels. To
calculate the thresholds, these values were combined as
shown in Eq. (12). The expectation operator, E, used in
Eq. (12) was previously defined in Eq. (6).
2*7
1 ,__E(average poweri)+
threshold = [_;-_ i=1
2*7
1 * Z 3 * standard deviationi] * safety factor
2*7 i=t
(12)
A factor of safety from 1.5 to 3.5 was needed to ensure
no false failure indications for the A2 nominal f'rrings.
The safety factors reflected the variations in signal
behavior observed over these firings. The thresholds and
safety factors are given in Table 2. When used in the
failure detection mode, failure of the average signal
power of a parameter to fall beneath its threshold results
in a failure indication.
For some of the parameters sensitive to venting and
pressurization, the required safety factors were greater
than 2.5. These parameters were the HPOT discharge
temperatures (PIDs 233 and 234) and the Prebumer
Boost Pump (PBP) discharge temperature(PID 94). The
high safety factors were attributed to the transient
behavior introduced by the venting and pressurization
processes. As with the time series algorithm, the
average signal power algorithm could be applied to a
larger set of parameters if the effects due to these
processes could be removed. In addition, the HPFP shaft
speed (PID 260) also required a large safety factor. This
was attributed to the extremely noisy signal observed
for this parameter. The larger safety factors decreased the
ability of the average signal power algorithm to detect
engine anomalies, tM.aebydegrading the effectiveness of
the algorithm. Thus, the parameters which required
factors of safety greater than 2.5 were not used for
failure detection.
Results and Discussion
Failure indication thresholds were established by
applying the time series and average signal power
algorithms to seven A2 nominal tests. Four anomalous
firings and one A1 nominal firing were tested using the
thresholds given in Table 2.
The four anomalous test firings analyzed, A2-249,
A1-340, A1-364, and A1-436, were all High Pressure
Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) failures. Detailed failure
summaries may be found in Ref. 2. These firings were
chosen for two reasons: (1) the failures occurred during
steady-state operation of the engine and (2) the firings
exhibited failure indications before redline cutoff values
were attained. In addition, a more recent nominal firing,
AI-618, was also tested against the thresholds to ensure
that false failure indications would not occur. Although
only HPVrP anomalies were considered, performance
parameters from many parts of the engine were selected.
The high degree of interdependence among engine
components typically causes a failure in one component
to quickly manifest itself throughout the engine.
In applying the time series algorithm to the
parameters indicated in Table 1, a series of plots was
developed to evaluate the validity of the computed
models. Figure 2 displays an example of the plots
necessary in determining validity of the AR[5] model
for the HPFP discharge pressure for test A2-463.
Figure 2(a) displays the five zeros of the model, along
with the uncertainties in their locations. The
uncertainties are calculated for both the real and
imaginary parts; thus, the uncertainty in location of the
real zero is given by a line. As required for stability, the
zeros all lie within the unit circle, and their uncertainty
regions do not overlap or cross the unit circle.
Figure 2(b) compares the trends in the frequency
response of the model with the trends in the frequency
response of the actual data. As can be seen, these two
curves respond similarly with frequency. Finally, the
autocorrelation function of the residuals for the 4-see
model computation window is given in Fig. 2(c). The
autocorrelation of the residuals is well within the
confidence interval for lags greater than zero, indicating
that the residuals are random noise as required. These
figures demonstrate that the AR[5] model is a valid
predictor of the I-IPFPdischarge pressure.
Figure 3 is an example of the application of the
time series algorithm to an anomalous test fu'ing. The
HPFP discharge pressure for test A1-340 is the
parameter shown. Within each 4-see window, the
autocorrelation function of the residuals is computed,
and the maximum value exceeding the confidence
interval is plotted as a fun,:tion of time. The failure
indication thresholds for the,. HPFP discharge pressure
are also indicated in Fig. 3. l'he parameter exceeds the
thresholds seven times. The;e times correspond to the
events detailed in the failu, e summary report for this
test fLring. During test A1-2,40, the Turn/Around duct
inner wall fractured at 20.6 sec and major ruptures
occurred at 290 see.2 Figure 3 also displays the tendency
of the residuals to exceed th_ thresholds for an interval
of time, and then subseque_ltly fall back between the
thresholds. This can be attributed to attempts, by the
engine, to compensate for aaomalous occurrences and
return to a nominal mode of,)peration.
Table 3(a) lists a majority of the failure indication
times obtained by applying the time series algorithm to
the four anomalous test Lrings. The values listed
indicate the times, in secords from start, at which a
given parameter exceede:l its failure indication
thresholds. In some cases, the residual autocorrelation
function confidence interval was exceeded for the model
computation window. SuclI models became biased
estimators of future behavior and were therefore
considered invalid. The parameters affected by this
phenomenon were the mixlure ratio (PID 8) for test
fwings A1-340 and A1-364, and the Low Pressure Fuel
Pump (LPFP) shaft speed (PID 32) for test f'u'ing A1-
364. The question of model validity presents a unique
implementation concern for the time series algorithm.
A model can be checked in real-time; however, it cannot
be recomputed using a different order number. Thus, the
failure detection capability of the time series algorithm
would be compromised as lhe number of parameters
with invalid models increased.
When space permitted, all of the times at which the
time series algorithm thresaolds were exceeded are
included in Table 3(a). For some parameters, the times
that the thresholds were excc_:ded were too numerous to
list completely. For these pltrameters, the first failure
indication times are given, as well as those times which
were in closest agreement with the failure indication
times of the other parameters. This was done to show
agreement among the param:ters of a given test firing
and to provide insight into the progression of engine
problems during the test firiag. For example, test A2-
249 showed agreement am(,ng several parameters at
approximately 398 sec. This _:ould be in response to the
melting of the KeI-F ring documented at 374 see. 2
However, the MCC pressure (PID 130), the HPFP shaft
speed (PID 260) and the LPFP shaft speed (PID 32)
clearly gave earlier indications of abnormal engine
behavior at 123, 156, and 146 sec, respectively. The
failure summary report indicated that cavitation of the
HPFP commenced at 108 sec due to the increased pump
inlet temperatures caused by propellant transfer.
For each anomalous firing, two types of failure
indication times for the time series algorithm were
extracted from Table 3(a). The first type was the first
time at which any parameter of a given test firing
exceeded its failure indication thresholds. The first
failure indication times for tests A2-249, A1-340, A1-
364, and A1-436 were 123, 21 , 137 and 176 sec,
respectively. These times were at least 250 sec earlier
than the corresponding redline cutoff times which are
also given in Table 3(a). The second type of failure
indication time is the first time at which two or more
parameters simultaneously indicated a failure. Table 3(b)
lists these times for the four anomalous firings, along
with the number of parameters in agreement. The fhst
simultaneous failure indication times occurred at least
50 sec prior to the redline cutoff times. The first
simultaneous failure indication times are significant
since agreement between two or more parameters
increases the likelihood that an engine problem has
occurred. In the absence of a thorough sensor signal
validation package, agreement among several sensors
minimizes the chance of a sensor failure being
interpreted as an engine problem. On the other hand,
requiring multiple parameters to exceed the thresholds
simultaneously reduces the ability of the algorithm to
detect failures before they have propagated through the
system. For the anomalous firings studied, either of the
time series algorithm failure indication times could have
alerted engine operators and prevented the progression of
these failures to catastrophic levels.
An example of the computation of the average
signal power for a nominal test firing is given in
Fig. 4. The interval over which the average signal
power was computed for the HPFP discharge pressure
for test firing A2-457 is given in Fig. 4(a), and the
resulting average signal power is given as a function of
time in Fig. 4(b). The fluctuations in the average signal
power were observed in all of the nominal firings and
were considered normal. The fluctuations were taken
into account in calculating the thresholds for the
parameters. The HPFP discharge pressure had a
threshold of 436, well above the maximum average
signal power shown in Fig. 4(b).
An example of the application of the average signal
power algorithm to an anomalous list Cuing is given in
Fig. 5. Figure 5(a) shows the interval over which the
average signal power was computed for the HPFP
discharge pressure for list fling A1-340. Figure 5(b)
displays the resulting average signal power, as a
function of time. The failure indication threshold
calculated from the A2 nominal firings is also shown.
As can be seen, increases in the average signal power
concur with the deviations observed in the signal. The
maximum average signal power for test A1-340 is
almost an order of magnitude greater than the maximum
average signal power for a nominal firing. Figures 3 and
5(b) show that, for the HPFP discharge pressure, the
thresholds for both algorithms were exceeded at
approximately the same times. However, the average
signal power exceeded its threshold by a much larger
percentage than did the time series algorithm. This may
be critical if testing against additional nominal firings
required the _lds to be increased.
Table 4(a) summarizes the application of the
average signal power algorithm to the four anomalous
test firings. The values listed indicate the times, in
seconds from start, at which a given parameter exceeded
its average signal power threshold. Most of the times at
which the thresholds were exceeded were included in
Table 4(a) to show agreement among parameters of a
given list firing and to demonstrate the progression of
the failure during the test firing. For example, test
firing A1-340 showed agreement among five parameters
at 21 sec and eight parameters at 290 sec. As stated
previously, this concurred with the failure investigation
summary report which states that the Turn/Around duct
inner wall fractured at 20.6 sec and major ruptures
occurredat2<)0sec.2
The two types of failure indication times deter-
mined for the time series algorithm were also considered
for the average signal power algorithm. The first failure
indications for the average signal power algorithm for
tests A2-249, A1-340, A1-364, and A1-436 were 61,
21, 149, and 32 sec, respectively. These times were at
least 240 sec earlier than the corresponding redline
cutoff times which are given in Table 4(a). The first
time at which two or more parameters exceeded their
thresholds are given for each anomalous test firing in
Table 403), along with the number of parameters which
were in agreement. Generally, the first simultaneous
failure indication times were substantially earlier than
the redline cutoff times. As with the time series algor-
ithm, the simultaneous indication of a fault by two or
more parameters increases the likelihood that an actual
engine problem has occurred and minimizes the chance
of erroneous failure indications.
A comparison between Tables 3(a) and 4(a)
indicates that the average signal power algorithm
detected an engine problem 62 sex earlier than the time
series algorithm for fn-ing A2-249 and 144 see earlier
for fling A1-436. For test AI-340, the two approaches
had identical fhst failure indication times, and for list
A1-364, the time series algorithm indicated a failure
condition 12 see earlier than the average signal power
algorithm. The HPFP shaft speed (PID 260) provided
the earliest failure indication time for test A1-364. This
parameter was not evaluated by the average signal power
method due to the high safety factor required. For all
four anomalous firings, the HPFP shaft speed provided
early failure indications using the time series algorithm.
This was expected since the four anomalous firings
considered in this study were all HPFTP failures. The
average signal power was computed for six parameters
to which the time series algorithm was not applied.
With the exception of the LPOP shaft speed (PID 30),
these additional parameters provided failure indications
earlier than the redline cutoff times. For test A2-249,
one of the additional parameters, the HPFT discharge
temperature (PID 231), gave the earliest failure
indication time.
By comparing Tables 3(b) and 4(b), it is evident
that the average signal power algorithm had a greater
number of parameters contributing to the first simul-
taneous failure indication time for each anomalous test
firing. A larger number of concurring parameters
increased confidence in the ability of the average signal
power algorithm to detect actual engine failures. The
two algorithms had an identical first simultaneous fail-
ure indication time for test A2-249. For tests A1-340
and A1-436, the average signal power algorithm gave
times that were 270 and 321 see earlier than the time
series algorithm, respectively. For A1-364, the time
series algorithm gave a time which was 233 sec earlier.
Simultaneous failure indication times were explored to
demonstrate the need for shutdown recommendation
criteria in addition to failure indication thresholds.
Failed sensors are of particular concern since no
thorough sensor screening techniques currently exist on
the SSME. It is vital that an algorithm not issue a
shutdown command because of a failed sensor. The
shutdown recommendation criteria must be established
to ensure no erroneous failure indications on a nominal
test, even in the event of failed sensors.
An additional nominal firing, A1-618, was tested
using the time series and average signal power
thresholds developed in this study. This was done to
increase confidence in the thresholds of the two
algorithms. Neither algorithm produced any failure
indications for this test fmng. An extensive amount of
testing against additional nominal test firings is required
to validate and refine the proposed thresholds, and to
establish shutdown recommendation criteria based on
the thresholds. Testing against additional anomalous
firings would further defire the capabilities of the two
algorithms.
Concludil tg_Ig.c.mgfl_
The earliest possibl_ detection of anomalous
behavior during a fning of the SSME is critical. This
investigation determined the ability of two algorithms
to detect the onset of engine faults during steady-state
operation of the engine. Tirae series techniques had been
previously studied. In this tnvestigation, the time series
algorithm used fifth order" AR models to predict the
future behavior of parameters based on their past
behavior. The average signal power algorithm was a
newly proposed SSME fadure detection algorithm. It
consisted of computing ard tracking variations in the
average signal power with time. The same seven A2
nominal tests were used to develop parameter fault
indication thresholds for both algorithms. These
thresholds were applied to four anomalous firings and
one additional nominal f'mllg.
For all four anomalot4s test firings, both the time
series algorithm and the awxage signal power algorithm
provided first failure indication times and first
simultaneous failure indication times that were
significantly earlier than th,_ redline cutoff times. For all
four firings, the average signal power algorithm had a
larger number of parameters contributing to the first
simultaneous failure irMication times. This is
significant since agreement between several parameters
increases the likelihood that an engine problem has
occurred, and minimizes the chance of false failure
indications. Confidence in both algorithms was further
established when the thre;_holds did not produce any
erroneous failure indications for the additional nominal
firing.
The average signal l_wer algorithm had several
advantages over the time series algorithm. A longer
window was needed for the time series algorithm to
ensure model validity. The longer window increased the
time during which this algorithm was not available for
failure detection. Even with this longer window several
of the calculated models were invalid. The question of
model validity presented a unique implementation
concern for the time series algorithm. A model can be
checked in rcal-time; however, it cannot be recomputed
using a different order number. A large number of
invalid models on a test firing would compromise the
failure detection capability of the time series algorithm.
The average signal power algorithm was applicable to a
larger set of performance parameters because it did not
depend as rigidly on the stationary behavior of the
signal. Stationary behavior was achieved over the 2-sec
interval used to compute the average signal power,
allowing this algorithm to be applied to parameters
exhibiting overall non-stationary trends.
Some types of sensor failures would cause both of
the algorithms to exceed their thresholds. This indicates
the need for sensor failure detection methods in order to
eliminate the possibility of a sensor failure being
interpreted as an engine problem. Both algorithms were
affected by engine processes such as tank venting and
pressurization, although the average signal power
algorithm was less sensitive because it did not involve
the computation of a model. Both algorithms could be
applied to a larger set of performance parameters if a
technique were developed to remove the transient effects
caused by these processes.
The failure indication thresholds developed in this
investigation must be tested extensively against
additional nominal and anomalous firings. The nominal
tests would refine the thresholds to ensure no erroneous
failure indications, and the anomalous test firings would
further demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of
the algorithms. Finally, shutdown recommendation
criteria must be developed for the algorithms.
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PID No.
8
17
24
30
32
58
59
90
94
130
203
2O9
231
233
234
260
Parameter Name
Mixture Ratio
MCC Coolant Discharge Press.
MCC Hot,as Injector Press.
LPOP Shatt Speed
LPFP Shait Speed
HPFP Discharl[ePressure
Fuel Preburner Chamber Press.
PBP Discharl[ePressure
HPOP Discharge Pressure
PBP Discharge Temperature
MCC Pressure
Ave. Power
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Time Series
x
x x
x
x
HPFP Inlet Pressure
HPOP Inlet Pressure
x
HPFT Dishar_e Temp. A
HPFT Dishar_e Temp. B
HPOT Discharl[eTemp. A
HPOT Discharl[eTemp. B
HPFP ShaftSpeed
x
x
X
x
x
x
x
x
x -algorithmapplied
Table 1. DescriptionofPID numbers used with time seriesand average signalpower
algorithms.
I0
I_ID No.
17
24
3O
32
52
58
Time Series
Thresholds
+ .60
+ .50
+ .50
+ .55
+ .50
+ .60
90 + .475
94 ""
130 _+.50
203 ""
Avera_ Power
Thresh-
olds
.00112
Safety
Factors
1.5
200 1.5
125 1.5
1598 2.5
25O9
436
232
6
1.5
1.5
1.5
911 1.5
268 1.5
.04 3.0
47 1.5
4 1.5
1.5
231 -- 32 2.0
232 -- 38 2.5
233 -- 154 3.5
234
26O
104
55OOOO
Table 2.
+ .65
3.5
3.5
Thresholds calculated from the nominal test
firings for the time series algorithm and the
average signal power algorithm, and safety
factors for the average signal power algorithm.
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A2-249
a
A1-340
C
A1-364
C
A1-436
a8
17 398-401 291-293 154,245 176_2
387-90
24 a 290 388-90 a
146-8 .... 224- 369-70,377-9
32 35 .... 304-5,... 280,291-93 c 394-6,414
390-7,402-10,.. 432-33
421-49 d
52 398-399 21-3_91-3 389-390 a
380
58 b b 387-90 a
90 401 b 203245,302 a
387-390
130 123,306-307 291-93 387-90 a
399
26O 56-65,...
99-247 ....
276-9 d
405.5
156-227
229-32,430-1
434
450.58
137,142-56 ....
300-75,377,
390-1 d
392.15Redline
Cutoff Time
203,205,...
353-423,425-
511,...588-9 d
611.06
a thresholdnot exceeded
b failedsensor
c model not valid
d timestoonumerous tolistcompletely
Table 3a. The times,in seconds from start,at which the four anomalous test
firings exceeded the time series algorithm failure indication
thresholds.
First
ISimultaneous
Failure
_Indication Time
Number of
Concurring
Parameters
AS-249
396
2
A1-340
291 154
A1-436
369
Table 3b. The firsttimes, in seconds from start,at which two or more
parameters simultaneously indicated failure,and the number of
parameters which exceededtheirthresholdsatthesetimes.
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Test No.
PID No.
A2-249 A1-340 A1-364 A1438
8 a 22_90-291 a a
17 399,413 21-2,290-1 387-388 a
357-358
24 21-2_90-2,
358
a
32-3,..47-8,.
72-8,83-4,90-1
.. 117-9,..201-2
221-3,..231,..
319-20,..467-8 c
30 a b a a
32 a 290-291 a a
52 398-399,413 21-2,290-1 387-388 a
357-358
58 b b 387-388 a
21,290-291106,399 38759
48-9,72-3,90-1
119,202,221-3,
..,319,343-4,..
484,..543,..
580 C
90 a b a 49
48-9,72-3,91
130 398-399 21-2,290-1 387-388 150,201-2,241
357-358 344,461,475
484-485
203 a 290-291 a a
209 _8-89,125-126 a 211 a
}1,123,..,398- 149,154,159
231 }0,410,413,.. b 182-3_192A4 205,319
431-4,443-6 316-7,335,
449 c 387-388
232 a
405.5Redline
Cutoff Time
137,327,409
412-3,415-6
t29,433-6,447
387-388
392.15450.58
Table 4a.
84,91,176r2oI
231_297,373
402-4,484,512
543,603-4
611.05
a thresholdnot exceeded
b failedsensor
ctimestoonumerous tolistcompletely
The tmes, in seconds from start,at which the four anomalous test
firings exceeded the average signal power algorithm failure
indicationthresholds.
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A2.249 A1-340 A1-364 A1.436
First
Simultaneous
Failure
Indication Time
Number of
Concurring
Parameters
398
3
21 387 48
Table 4b. The first times, in seconds from start, at which two or more
parameters simultaneously indicated failure, and the number of
parameters which exceeded their thresholds at these times.
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